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Abstract 
The core cognitive foundation of cooperative values, norms and beliefs can 
need updating and refurbishing just like the hard economic assets of plant 
and equipment that maintain their visible, outward structure. Import cOlnp~ 
tition,  agricultural  industrialization,  and  market  failure  have  led 
cooperatives to  question beliefs which put the survival of the farm  above 
the cooperative. Jeffersonian agrarian values contributed to a culture where 
cooperatives were run for the needs of farmers, not consumers. This led co-
operatives to over-expand into commodity areas that were not economically 
sustainable. Or, cooperatives compensated growers for poor production de-
cisions at a cost to other members. These values were based on a cultural 
model  that "cooperatives were  like  a  family."  Trying to  provide a  small 
town  personal  ambiance  and  the  efficiencies  of large  scale  production 
within the same organization is  a cultural model that cooperatives used to 
"be all things to all  people". Farmer attrition has forced cooperatives into 
adopting a  core  business  focus  where  co-ops  shed  all  businesses  except 
those they can do very well. This cultural transition has been aided by agri-
cu Itural  industrialization's  focus  on  the  farmer  as  individual  "farm 
manager",  in  contrast to the  idealized Jeffersonian farm  family.  Coopera-
tives  are  now seen  as  separate and  independent of the  farmer,  not as  an 
extension  of the  farm,  giving co-ops  greater  latitude  to  be  more  market 
driven. 
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Introduction 
Culture drives economic behavior. This can be seen in the way the concept of service 
offered by regional and local grain, farm supply and citrus cooperatives in the US has 
evolved in the last 20 years. Service started out being a producer-driven concept as-
sociated with cultural  expectations of entitlement.  The  institutional  framework  for 
realizing these expectations was  created by  multi-commodity cooperatives such as 
Farmland, Countrymark, and Agway. Intense competition for members led coopera-
tives to diversify by adding on services that reinforced members' primary identity as 
producers. Farmer attrition and the resulting cooperative shake-out has led to service 
becoming defined as a market-driven concept, where the needs of the customer have 
become paramount. 
The institutional framework has evolved into an industrialized system of agricul-
ture;  backgrounding  producers  as  a  cooperative  identity  has  coalesced  around 
participation in value-added food chains. For cooperatives, the spotlight is now less 
on producers as potential members than on the attributes of what members produce -
consumer appeal, marketability, safety, exclusivity, variety, shelf life. 
Cooperatives now diversify by allocating grower product among alternative  in-
termediate and end use markets carrying different degrees of risk and return. Being a 
low cost, nimble supplier, increasing shelf space, or hedging against import competi-
tion by partnering with foreign suppliers, are the new ways service is being defined. 
C~operatives have pulled up their roots. Entrenched cultural messages encourag-
ing farmers to produce without the back-up of profitable markets are out of  sync with 
cooperatives' contemporary needs. As long as the US  enjoyed a prominent position 
in world markets, goals that followed from commonly-held beliefs about cooperative 
marketing could pass  without close  scrutiny.  When domestic  labor and  land  costs 
became  comparatively high  in  the  aftermath of world  economic  development  and 
trade liberalization, the US became an intermittent, swing supplier to important mar-
kets.  Moreover,  in  the  1990s,  Wal-mart  changed  the  "rules  of the  game"  by 
intr)iJducing  the concept of "everyday low prices" into American retailing (Schnei-
der: 1998: 295). Competitive pressure intensified when Walmart spread this concept 
worldwide by  opening stores  in  Indonesia,  Argentina,  China,  Mexico,  Brazil,  and 
Canada (Schneider: 1998:294). 
The " question, "who do  we serve?" has always been important for cooperatives. 
Most have organizational features - open membership and minimal equity demands -
that,  in  an organizational  culture prizing sensitivity and reactivity to  member de-
mands,  create a vulnerability to  loss of focus  and financial  stress. As cooperatives 
become more market oriented and enter new, "foreign" markets to  preserve the fi-
nancial"  integrity  of  their  organizations,  this  question  can  take  on  additional 
meanings,  the topic  of this  study.  Fundamentally it is  a  question of,  "how do we 
compete?" 
Typically, economists have not paid much attention to culture. Economists treat How Culture Drives Economic Behavior in Cooperatives  21 
most decisions as  a  matter of prices and quantities or financial  considerations like 
interest rates. Cooperative management, members and directors also have not explic-
itly considered culture.  When decisions diverge from  economic considerations, the 
cooperative community typically regards the decision-making process as "political." 
This does not mean a political party, but refers to the variety of commodity interests, 
geographic interests, or farm organization affiliations that can subtly influence coop-
erative agendas on a day-to-day basis. 
Underlying these is a more fundamental, unified aspect of  cooperative culture, re-
flecting common understandings of what cooperatives should be like, the values they 
encompass, and so forth. They typically include:  / 
•  being altruistic, not exploiting the business for a profit; 
•  emphasizing service over making money; 
•  valuing the "small and personal" over the "large and impersonal; 
•  displaying an unwillingness to let go of relationships, things, or places; 
•  allowing the cooperative to assume risk on behalf of producers; 
•  attaining self-sufficiency to minimize farmer dependency on those perceived 
as outsiders; 
.,  preferring to subordinate individual goals to the good of  the whole; and 
•  valuing equality ("treating everyone equally"). 
Collectiv,ely, 'these are the social mores of a group that is more like a family than 
a business. Together, they form a schema or metaphorical framework - "cooperatives 
are like a family" - that can provide insights into multiple dimensions of  cooperative 
behavior. 
These themes were drawn from some 30 interviews conducted with regional and 
local cooperative management in  the years 2000/2002.  During the interviews, man-
agers provided examples of  expressions or language that represented traditional ways 
of talking  about  cooperatives  and  alternatives  reflecting  the  contemporary  issues 
cooperatives are facing.  This give-and-take is  an  example of how cooperatives are 
socially constructed in  the day-to-day transactions, consultations, and informal  ex-
changes that routinely occur between members, management and staff. 
Governance is  usually considered to  be  the primary influence in  cooperative or-
ganization.  Yet,  even  informal  interchanges  between  management,  staff,  members 
and  nonmembers  provide a  setting for  expectations to  be  expressed and  mediated 
through language, allowing new understandings to be reached about the boundaries, 
dimensions,  or role,  of the  cooperative.  How these  expectations  are  resolved  can 
have a  significant effect on transaction costs, or the efficiency of equity allocation 
within the cooperative.  Social construction through everyday language gives coop-
eratives a dynamism and fluidity that is not possible through the time-bound ritual of 
governance, which is necessarily limited and co" ntingent. 
Cooperative  managers  are  increasingly  asking  members  to  exalnine  taken-for-
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also asking members whether the "cooperatives are like a family" construct and the 
values it encompasses - service, altruism, etc. - are primarily the values needed for ' 
organizational survival in an economic climate that differs.  considerably from the era 
when most cooperatives were established. Member expectations are often based on 
the continuity of business experience they have had with the cooperative, sometimes 
extending through multiple generations, as in the case of Land O'Lakes and Sunkist. 
Managerial  expectations  of members  are  often  affected  by  more  immediate  and 
pressing concerns, such as  import competition, the need for the cooperative to grow 
or keep up with competitors, and potential capital shortages triggered by farmer attri-
tion. 
Language is a tool used by managers to strengthen and redefine cooperative iden-
tities so that social relations (the familial core of  cooperatives) becomes a mechanism 
reinforcing efficient use of existing assets and equity. Repeated acts of communica-
tion can develop a consistent set of expectations between members and managers that 
create the  basis for a specific organizational culture.  In  short, the cooperative will 
mean the same thing to members and managers. Culture represents shared systems of 
meaning,  including values,  priorities, and beliefs.  A focused  organizational culture 
gives a cooperative a sense of mission that makes it a formidable competitor. New 
Generation Cooperatives have attracted strong producer interest because they have a 
clear-cut purpose and focus. Older, multi-commodity cooperatives were created in an 
era when altruism, a core cooperative value, mattered greatly to producers but it is of 
relatively  less  importance to  members  of contemporary New Generation  coopera-
tives.  This suggests that the core cognitive foundation of cooperative values, norms 
and beliefs may need periodic examination, updating, and refurbishing, just like the 
hard  economic  assets  of plant and  equipment that maintain their visible,  outward 
structure. 
Altruism: Profit vs service 
/ 
Surveyed managers did not use the word "altruism" but their language was perme-
ated by a constant concern for members that is encapsulated by this term. Those who 
reviewed  th~s re'search felt the term aptly described how American cooperatives have 
a tendency to overextend themselves serving producers.  Concepts of altruism may 
differ, however, especially in Europe, where altruism has been recently interpreted as 
going beyond the members' interest to benefit  lar~er segments of society. Here, us-
age  of the  term  altruism  is  ad hoc,  derived  from  the  field  situation  of manager 
interviews. 
Within the US, the culture of cooperative altruism appears to be rooted in (1) lim-
ited  returns  on  investment;  (2)  service  at  cost;  and  (3)  cooperative  investment 
choices. "Limited returns on investment" is  the phase usually used to described the 
fact that dividends on capital stock by cooperatives are limited to 8 percent. This may How Culture Drives Economic Behavior in Cooperatives  23 
be responsible for a perception that cooperatives do not have to be profitable, or that 
managers do not have to push to get high returns. Farmer's' equity looks like a gift or 
"free money" when managers do not aggressively pursue opportunities for coopera-
, tive  growth  and  expansion.  During  the  1950s  and  sporadically  thereafter,  public 
policies that encouraged grain storage may have led to  an image of cooperatives as 
passive caretakers of produc! ers' grain, an image brought over to other commodities 
or situations. 
To managers, the surface meaning of altruism was "don't exploit the business for 
a profit," i.e., don't take advantage of farmers. Altruism really represented a cultural 
ambivalence about earning profits that existed among members and managers alike, 
"profits were bad." Managers attributed this  culture to  the Rochdale pioneers who 
wanted cooperatives to be nonprofit. In the language of  the Rochdale principles, after 
cost returns that are paid to members become "net margin." When such1eturns are 
paid to  the cooperative, they become, "unallocated reserves," commonly known as 
"profit." Attaining profits made cooperatives like other businesses which, in a sense, 
- l1}~ant they lost the organizational distinctiveness sought by the Rochdale pioneers 
(and,  in  a  later  era,  by  cooperative  philosopher,  Edwiri  Nourse).  So,  managers 
stressed the importance of other values. "We didn't make money but we did it for the 
good of  the members so it's okay, they benefitted, it's good for them." Managers also 
said, "Even though the asset isn't returning what it should, we can't afford not to run 
it." The corollary of this approach was, "It's our responsibility to supply the mem-
bers because we are their caretakers but we can't demand they have loyalty back." 
Cooperatives have  prominent roles  in  industries that have  structural  barriers to 
high  returns"  such  as  excess capacity (flour milling),  high  capitalization (fertilizer 
manufacturing),  an  aging  infrastructure  (grain  elevation),  or  import  competition 
(fruits  and  vegetables) - hence the  expression,  "cooperatives do  more  with  less". 
Cooperatives may not be bench-marking themselves to the highest standards of per-
formance  in  their  investment  choices  because  they  quietly  acknowledge  profit-
seeking corporations would not be found  in  some of these industries. It is  not clear 
whether involvement reflects commitment to producer service - no  one else would 
do it - or preference. In fact, cooperatives view themselves as "have-to" businesses, 
i.e., we "have to" be in fertilizer or foods or convenience stores. 
Since  agriculture  is  a  cyclical  business,  the  hope  existed  that  adverse  market 
events might be self-correcting. Pruning losing businesses was difficult for managers. 
The economic consequence was that cooperatives stayed too long in so-called "losing 
businesses" because members are customers first,  owners second. Return on  equity 
(ROE) becomes secondary to service. Adopting the mores of the so-called business 
model of, "Will it make money? If not, why are we doing it?" is  a challenging task 
for cooperatives because the values of altruism, service, self-sufficiency, etc., have 
permeated cooperative culture so thoroughly. 
Altruism interacts with cooperative norms of  equality to become cultural pressure 
to "keep all growers happy". Thomas Jefferson viewed farmers  as  an exalted class 
who would risk dependence,  ambition, and greed if exposed to  the "casualties and 24  J.A.  Hogeland 
caprice of customers" (Jefferson,  1943[1785]:678).  In  "Notes on the State of Vir-
ginia," Jefferson depicted an agrarian ideal of farmers placing their own needs above 
the  needs  of consumers  through  making  the  farm  diversified  and  self-contained 
(Jefferson, 1943 [1785] :679). Early in the history of  the US the family farmer became 
morally superior to his urban counterparts (Conlougue, 2001: 11).  This was cultural 
license for belief systems to develop that cooperatives should be run for the needs of 
producers, not the market. 
Detachment from  consumer preferences  led  producers to  make  poor decisions, 
like overfeeding cattle or producing the wrong variety of fruit. Cooperative response 
was  marketing  education,  often  sufficiently  intensive  that  cooperatives  could  not 
position themselves as  price leaders,  only as  offering a "fair" price,  even to those 
growers who did not use the educational services. Education functioned as a leveling 
mechanism to restrict grower prices and this became the cost of altruism.  Altruism 
interacted with cooperative norms of equality to provide "one price to all",  which 
became a defining characteristic of  cooperative pricing policy. 
Dependency and assistance co-existed within the cooperative system as  farmers 
implicitly relied on the cooperative to take care of  them (e.g.,  "Mother Sunkist") and 
regional cooperatives tried to be a "big brother" to member locals by providing the 
conceptual  thinking  and  strategic  planning  for  their  operations.  The  demands  for 
equality made by smaller locals within the federated system - ' ~'Don  't treat the super 
any different from me" - really represented a call for assistance because patronage 
refunds from regional cooperatives were used to subsidize "things that weren't prof-
itable"  and that included smaller locals,  according to  managers of larger,  "super" 
locals. 
Fundamentally, altruism was about insulating producers or cooperatives from the 
forces  of competition. Cooperatives were an organizational form  predicated on the 
family farm,so preserving the family farmer was their implicit mandate. Normally, 
this took the form of processing operations, bargaining activities or widening market 
access, all rational economic activities. Culture took' over when, irrespective of mar-
ket  conditions  or  potential  losses  to  the  cooperative,  cooperatives  covered  the 
fi~ncial risk of members' decisions by guaranteeing them market share or a floor 
price. The cooperative assumed the risk of  the growers' production decisions, not the 
grower, because "cooperatives are like a family." 
Altruism  and  agricultural  industrialization  were  combined  as  Land  0'  Lakes, 
Farmland, andCountrymark tried to maintain family farmers as an independent class 
in  pork production,  support the economic structure of rural  communities  by  using 
local  cooperatives  as  feed  distributors  and  produce  pork efficiently  and  cheaply. 
Farmland had the added goat of producing "from farm gate to plate" with a branded 
pork product. An integrated agricultural foods company growing value from the pro- " 
ducer to consumer is the epitome of what an agricultural cooperative can accomplish. 
Noel Estenson, former CEO of Harvest States (now CHS, Inc.) captured this cultural 
vision in the slogan, "from the Back 40 [acres] to Aisle 40." (Estenson, 1998). 
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primarily had one goal,  producing cheap  pork.  In this  case,  it  was  impossible  for 
"cooperatives to do more with less." When slaughter capacity became a bottleneck, 
forcing prices to  a historic low in  1998/99, Land O'Lakes lost $26M covering the 
contracts of member producers. Farmland eventually bypassed locals but these effi-
ciencies were not enough to compensate for the strain on resources to go  from  farm 
to table. Cooperatives went into production with worthy goals, - so many, in fact, that 
the accomplishment of  any single goal may have been compromised. 
The emerging cultural model is  less maternalistic, relying on the market to train 
producers  about  consumer  preferences,  not  the  cooperative.  Rescuing  a  class  of 
growers or locals stressed by commodity markets or poor decisions is  now jeen less 
from the victim perspective and more from the impact it has on members who will 
financially  underwrite such decisions. As  farms  have become highly specialized, it 
may be increasingly difficult for producers to identify with those in other commodity 
specialties. Changing notions of altruism and solidarity may follow farm demograph-
ics. Agricultural industrialization also changed the normative model of a family farm 
from  the  Jeffersonian  rural  household to  the  individualistic  farmer  as  a  "business 
manager" model. Such farmers undoubtedly have families but the focus on the indi-
vidual precludes Jeffersonian sentiments. 
The shock of market failure  also  affected  how members view altruism.  Farm-
land's  attempt  to  stave  off  bankruptcy  through  cross-subsidization,  to  try  to 
compensate  f~r lo'sses in  the fertilizer industry with meatpacking earnings made the 
cooperative community reconsider what fairness means. Altruism is now seen as less 
important than a new value of  transparency, which means a futl and open accounting 
of what the cooperative is doing. Altruism is being redefined as preserving the coop-
erative, not the individual grower or special interest groups. Land O'Lakes continues 
to  be  involved in  pork production through contracted feeder pig production which 
has been profitable because it minimizes cooperative exposure to risk. 
Cooperatives no longer guarantee market share to growers as a given, rather, they 
provide an opportunity for their members to secure market share. It is up to members 
as to how they use that opportunity. In the old systems of food marketing, coopera-
tives  took whatever quality  of grain or livestock producers delivered,  co-mingled 
them, and looked for a buyer among several possibilities. Dedicated production sys-
tems now spell out how a product is to be produced and who tbe buyer will be. The 
cooperative's role continues to be finding new buyers or product uses,  particularly 
globally.  Altruism  now  emphasizes  and  encompasses  consumers  through  product 
quality, integrity, safety, and reputation - the basis for the value embodied in coop-
erative  brand  names  like  Sunkist  and  Land  O'Lakes.  Accordingly,  growers  must 
meet tougher production standards, and in turn, they are starting to expect a higher 
level of financial performance from their cooperatives. Language aids this transition 
as managers replace the term, "service," with "value" or "value proposition" to  up-
grade member expectations and image of  cooperatives. 26  JA. Hogeland 
Nourse: Personalized marketing vs fighting monopoly 
Cooperatives  are  often  viewed  as  businesses  that provide  goods  and  services  "at 
cost". "Service at cost" is an  organizational model predicated on Jeffersonian values 
of integrity and "keeping everyone honest", which cooperatives, as an organizational 
fprm,  have  exploited to  counter monopolistic  pricing by  corporations.  In  the  folk 
model of a "perfect co-op", the bottom line should be zero at the ,end of the year. If 
any profits are earned, they are seen, in this folk model,  as  "taken off the backs of 
farmers through overcharging." 
The "service at cost" model is  also implicitly a business model for those who do 
not see change as desirable. Because no profits are  ~amed, no money is available to 
plow back into the business for growth to occur. For some locally owned grain eleva-
tors in the Midwest, the investment decision was framed as running the facility into 
the  ground  (defined as  "service at  cost") or reinvestment.  Customers who  wanted 
high quality, up-to-date facilities did not understand this culture. Yet, the service at 
cost model was culturally adaptive for producers who wanted to keep their coopera~ 
tives small, personal, and therefore less likely to exploit them. 
These populist sentiments were captured in the competitive yardstick model de-
veloped by agricultural economist Edwin Nourse in the early  194Gs (Nourse,  1992). 
Big business (and by association, profits) were bad in the Nourse framework, a cul-
tural  message  which  held  cooperatives  back  from  a  more  promi~ent role  in  the 
Ameri~an economy.  Nourse believed farmers  should form  cooperatives only when 
needed to offset monopoly power or compensate for inadequate services. After coop-
eratives had disciplined potential monopolists through the yardstick of competitive 
efficiency, Nourse believed they should simply maintain .watch dog status over an 
industry, not try to dominate it themselves. Let others compete and farmers farm, he 
.  advised.  This passive vision of cooperation left unanswered many of the questions 
that concern cooperatives today. 
For  example,  it  is  not  clear  how  big  cooperatives  should  get,  how  long  they 
should stay in a particular industry, and whether their relationship to other industry 
participants  should  be  one  of competitor  or  partner.  The  main  prescription  of 
Nourse's competitive yardstick model was that cooperatives should provide "an extra 
bid" or  "~xtra competition" to "keep everyone honest." But this cultural model was 
formed in response to concerns about market concentration and farmer exploitation 
during the first  part of the 20th century.  Today, the  concerns of farmers  and their 
cooperatives  are  much  different - getting  access  to  information,  finding  a  place 
within  a  value-added  system,  negotiating  an  equitable  ownership  role  within  that 
system, and addressing food safety and other product specification issues which are 
integral to the success of  those systems. 
At the same time, corporate market prominence sent a message to farmers: domi-
nate  or be  dominated,  and  larger cooperatives  considered  part of their mission to 
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farmer ownership. This led to a "friend - enemy" or "win - lose" culture of coopera-
tion, popularly known as the "co-ops vs the independents." The gain of one party is 
always at the other's expense, no joint gains are possible. The Nourse concept of an 
extra bid became competition for the sake of competition when farmers could con-
clude  that  two  cooperatives  in  the  same  community  or  at  the  same  level  were 
justified because "If  neither makes money that means the best deal at the farm gate." 
Cooperatives battled for over market share during the 1980s and 1990s. Initially, 
for  Farmland Industries,  in particular, the  cultural model  might have  been "We're 
Number One.  We're in the same league as  Cargill and ADM," but increasingly,  it 
came to be a debt fueled "Growth will solve our problem." Now, cooper,tives choose 
their growth targets selectively. Sunkist is  solidifying its position as  world leader in 
citrus through a more strategic, nuanced approach that includes significant cultural 
change.  By  acquiring  Purina Mills,  Land  O'Lakes pursues  "size  and  scale  while 
keeping the grassroots feel  of a co-op," said CEO Jack Gherty.  The acquisition al-
lowed the cooperative to become the largest North American feed supplier. 
Cooperatives are the organizational form  where "slnall and local" and the "large 
and less personal" get combined and often, contested. The 2001  bankruptcy of Iowa-
based Crestland Cooperative (Creston, IA) illustrates the complex issues triggered by 
cooperative expansion.  Farmer reaction to  the  bankruptcy was,  initially,  distress -
"People are really confused. They can't imagine how this could have happened to an 
organization this  big."  Crestland  had  challenged the  status  quo  by  adopting a  so-
called, "c6rporate mentality" in -its  quest to expand to superlocal status via "big rig" 
c'rop  sprayers,  Global  Positioning System  (GPS),  state  of the  art  feed  trucks,  and 
large producer hog networks. To some, the message conveyed by this apparatus was, 
"We're here to grow, to survive, and beat out other co-ops" - not, "We're here to be 
a part of  the community." 
Farmer  and  community  interpretation  of Crestland's  aggressive  expansion  in-
cluded the reaction "It's not a real co-op if it's big." For this group, Crestland was 
viewed as trying to stretch beyond its roots. Large producers seemed to be particu-
larly prone to view large  locals as just another incarnation of big agribusiness and 
they had no loyalty to either. "Who cares whether I buy from  a large local or a big 
chain?" - explained an Iowa farmer - "It appears that expectations have not caught 
up to what the reality of what agribusiness is today. People got used to a more per-
sonal way to doing business. It's hard to get used to a more corporatist management". 
"Large, efficient, and impersonal - says a business is  not a cooperative". Small and 
friendly and probably not particularly efficient because it's small - it's a cooperative. 
When other businesses in town decide to get aggressive, this culture makes it hard 
for  cooperatives  to  compete.  Meeting  competition  head-on  by  cut-throat  pricing, 
building more storage capacity, or adjusting prices to a volume-based "cost to serve" 
level,  that's not neighborly.  The  cultural  force  of the  family  metaphor reportedly 
restrains some managers or directors' from unabashedly pursuing growth for fear that 
they will lose what they already have. 
The perception that aggressiveness and eagerness to change put farmers'  money 28  J.A.  Hogeland 
at risk has held cooperatives back. Yet, the implicit cultural model followed by many 
farmer cooperatives, emphasizing service, has  risked farmers'  money to  the extent 
that, in 2002, Farmland Industries, the largest US  cooperative, filed  for bankruptcy, 
as did Agway, the largest cooperative in the US in the 1980s. 
The yardstick model sent the cultural message to  farmers  that cooperatives had 
two,  mutually exclusive, size-dependent missions,  fighting monopoly power (when 
they were large) or providing a "small and local" marketing experience for  farmers 
(when they were small).  Yet,  Nourse failed  to  realize that "farmers love  stuff." A 
production facility like a dairy plant or feed mill built to correct a market imbalance 
can acquire tremendous symbolic importance to  producers that Nourse did not con-
sider when he called for cooperative retrenchment as  part of the yardstick strategy. 
So,  established cooperatives did not follow  his  impractical advice. to  fade  into  the 
background  once a  market failure  had  been corrected.  And,  since the  agricultural 
economy did  not generate the  series of market failures  that Nourse  required  frotTI 
large cooperatives to justify their existence, they compensated, indeed, overcompen-
sated, by emphasizing the "small and local" cultural component of cooperation. For 
example,  Farmland  strove  to  be  "the giant  with  the  personal  touch"  by  trying to 
"grow big, but seeming to stay small to the membership" (Fite, 1978:381). 
The result was that large cooperatives were pulled in opposi; te directions. "Small 
and local" conflicts with the centralized, consolidated operations, scale economies, 
optimally located, and other systematic, rationalized ways of approaching coopera-
tion on a large scale. This cultural mission produces a confusing business mandate. 
What size  business  should cooperatives  use  for  bench marking purposes,  large or 
small? Are cooperatives really small organizations dressed in the trappings of large? 
The economic ramifications of  combining both in the same organization can lead to a 
situation where cooperatives attain world leadership in the supermarket display case 
from a production infrastructure described as "a dairy plant or feed mill in every pro-
ducers' back yard." 
Se,rvice is paramount 
For most agricultural cooperatives, the primary cultural value that drives economic 
behavi?r is service. Farmer ownership makes the service culture especially powerful 
and enduring within cooperatives - this asset is mine,  it should serve me.  In the co-
operative lexicon, "ownership" and "control" mean the same thing. In an  era when 
the  industrialization of agriculture  has  effectively displaced family  farmers,  when 
world trade has displaced seemingly secure markets, farmer control is  still  possible 
within cooperatives. 
The way service dictates choices within cooperatives is demonstrated when man-
agers or directors say "We take care of our members". Or, if managers want to cut 
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won't let me." As part of this service culture, there is a broad definition of member 
needs because farmers are continually asked what they want their cooperative to do. 
This leads to an "add-on" mentality - let's "add on this" and "add on that". This atti-
tude  is  reinforced  by  certain  expectations,  which  local  cooperative  managers 
described as  "Farmers like to go into every location and get everything they want," 
or,  "Farmers like to  see their equity investment spent at their own location,  where 
they can see it." 
The service culture gives primacy to member needs above all  other factors.  The 
fact  that members want something and  the  cooperative exists to  serve their needs 
makes other factors  secondary,  like  what the service costs, how it fits  in with the 
other services offered by the cooperative, whether the service is ·  already offered by 
competitors, and so on.  The economic consequence is  that the cooperative can be-
-come a multipurpose business  lacking a clear customer definition.  The~xpression 
"Cooperatives are all things to all  people," reveals the fundamental loss of purpose 
created by the  add-on  mentality,  which other cooperatives (discussed later) are  at-
tempting to recover. With the "add on" mentality, the cooperative defines itself as it 
goes along,  by accumulating a wide number of product lines,  typically not clearly 
related.  Ultimately,  it  becomes  very  difficult  for  such cooperatives to  achieve the 
critical mass and scale economics that would enable them to compete with more effi-
cient and focused suppliers. 
The "add-on" mentality brought Agway (Syracuse, NY), the largest cooperative 
in the US in the 1980s, to bankruptcy by 2002. Despite a strict policy that they would 
not get involved,  in  dairy processing, the New York-based supply cooperative pur-
chased  H.P.Hoo~, a fluid  dairy  company in  1980,  to  help members of Northeast 
dairy cooperatives stabilize milk markets (Anderson and Henehan, 2002:3). "Agway 
had no prior experience running a fluid milk business," which is  "very competitive, 
and operates much differently than an agricultural supply company" (Anderson and 
Henehan, 2002:3). In the following decade, Agway was able to pay a patronage re-
fund only twice. 
Intense member support for a particular service, sometimes just the highly vocal 
support of a few members, can be sufficient to dilute or override the importance of : 
economic factors. "Members, at times, asked Agway to do too much on their behalf 
without  thoroughly  understanding  the  costs  involved"  (Anderson  and  Henehan, 
2002: 11).  The management of the  cooperative,  particularly a regional  cooperative, 
then has  the  responsibility to  build an  organization  around  member choices.  Gold 
Kist (Atlanta, GA) used the slogan, "Diversification is  Our Strength," to reflect its 
interests in poultry, agronomy, cotton, and peanuts. 
If  there is a large number of farmers to be served by the cooperative, the coopera-
tive may be able to make a diversified service strategy work. Economic stressors can 
make it particularly hazardous for cooperatives to follow this strategy;however. 
Chief among these is  farmer attrition. As the number of farmers declines, fewer 
will  want any  particular service.  When  agriculture  left the  Southeast,  Gold  Kist's 
diversity  became  fragmentation  and  weakness  (Refrigerated  and  Frozen  Foods, 30  J.A.  Hogeland 
2002).  Farmers  also  have  become increasingly specialized,  so  their demands  have 
become more one-of-a-kind. Consequently, the service culture can set the coopera-
tive up  for dying a slow economic death, insofar - as  the assets accumulated to serve 
members in a variety of  ways are slowly and painfully sold off, one by one. To main-
tain cash  flow,  Agway shed two  profitable businesses,  Telmark leasing,  and their 
North  Dakota sunflower  business,  and,  nonetheless,  filed  for  bankruptcy  in  2002 
(Anderson and Henehan, 2002:3). 
Service delivery within cooperatives has often been provided by bundling, that is, 
grouping a particular service within a group of related products or services and pric-
ing them as a unit. As economic pressures force many farmers out of farming, those 
that remain are forced to examine costs more closely. Cooperatives that have "bun-
dled" items together may be forced to "de-couple" so producers can compare prices 
individually.  Cooperatives  that  have  built  an  administrative  or  overhead  system 
around providing service packages or production systems, may find producers want 
to  assemble  their  own  systems,  piecemeal,  from  different  vendors,  because  it  is 
cheaper. 
Appealing to customers through a broad product array may make a cooperative 
vulnerable to  transient consumer loyalties.  Farmers  may  pick and  choose,  but the 
cooperative is  stuck with the  overhead.  Cooperatives may  have  invested in  costly 
assets like feed mills and assumed that farmer desire was equivalent to  farmer use. 
Managers ref~rred to this cultural concept as "We will build it, and they will come." 
Consolidation among suppliers and  farmer-customers  has  resulted  in  large pro-
ducers driving hard bargains, and agribusiness conglomerates willing to do  what is 
necessary  to  capture the  business of these  customers.  In  this  context,  the  service 
strategy puts cooperatives in a particularly vulnerable position. More and more farm-
ers may be seeking the one-time only "best deal." So, local cooperative managers are 
beginning to revise the way they approach the concept of  service, by asking "Who do 
we  serve?  Who  is  our customer?  Will  they still  be there in  the  future?  Is  that the 
business we»vant? There's good business and bad business." 
These managers are starting to look at how much it will cost to serve a group of 
farmers  and say "Hey, we can't do  that.  Let's walk away.  Let someone else serve 
them". That is  th~ kind of thing a corporation operating for profit would do.  Instead 
of serving all customers - being all  things to  all  people - the cooperative "cherry-
picks" by pursuing the most attractive customers. 
Looking at their farmer-patrons in terms of their potential profit to the coopera-
tive introduces a form  of distancing into  what may have been a personal  or social 
relationship. In some rural communities, the relationship between management and 
directors and cooperative members has been so personal and linked that the coopera-
tive is  more like a family,  in some ways, than a business. This is shown in the way 
managers of small town, locally-owned grain elevators and farm supply stores go out 
of their way for their farmer-members. When a farmer pulls up at the co-op elevator 
at  closing time  with a truckload of grain, the  manager will  stay  late,  even though 
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the co-op will spray the farmer's fields at night because that is when the winds have 
died down.  Why  do  managers  do  this?  They said it  was  because "Our kids  go to 
school with their kids." 
In such communities, there is an intertwining of economic, social, neighborhood, 
kinship, and political dimensions within the cooperative bonds. While this has given 
cooperatives their cohesiveness and unity, it has also established certain expectations 
among farmers that may be resistant to change. If managers charge for advisory ser-
vices  previously  provided  as  a  free  service,  farmers  have  objected,  saying"Y  ou 
never charged me ·before.  You want my  business  ..  You better do  it." Yet managers 
cannot attract the skill level of technical help farmers need without paying a particu-
lar salary level. So, they have to become, in their words, "more of a business than a 
cooperative." This linguistic distinction shows the extent to which cooperatives have 
been put in a class apart from other businesses and held to different rules and expec-
tations. 
As managers try to  revise these expectations, they anticipate their cooperatives 
will  become less  personal  than  what their father's  co-op  was,  more of a business 
("arm's length") than family relationship. Establishing a new cognitive grounding for 
the cooperative is essential because long run margins for local cooperatives will be in 
technical support services, not traditional bulk commodity products. 
Regional cooperatives have a similar adjustment to make. Their task as manufac-
turers is to answer the question "What are we good at?" 
For Gold Kist? the answer was poultry, which they defined as their core business. 
This decision led them to divest their operations in  agronomy, pecans, catfish, farm 
supplies, and peanuts. Similarly, Land O'Lakes recently announced a phased reduc-
tion of its involvement in the pork industry due to the displacement of  family farmers 
by integrators and increased market volatility. 
By streamlining and narrowing their commodity focus these cooperatives are ap-
proaching, are the questions of service from the standpoint of "Who do  we  serve?" 
and "What are we good at?" 
They are using a dual focus that allows them to take more than just producer in-
terests into  account.  Agway essentially looked at the  question of service from  the 
standpoint of  "Who do we serve?" that is, producer interests. "What are we good at?" 
is a question which addresses the economic efficiencies of  the cooperative. 
The multi-commodity cooperative has to balance different producer interests and 
that can be  a  difficult task.  Farmland  Industries  and  Countrymark were  two  such 
cooperatives. These cooperatives had portfolios that, between them, included grain, 
pork,  turkeys,  fertilizer,  beef,  agronomy  and  petroleum.  The  portfolios  were  built 
from the standpoint of anticipating that a good year in one commodity would offset a 
bad year in another. So, an expectation of loss was built into the cooperative's cul-
ture. At some point, a commodity cycle was going to hit the cooperative hard. And, 
in fact, when particularly severe losses occurred for one commodity, as in the case of 
Farmland Industries, described below, it was sufficient to bankrupt the entire coop-
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Self-sufficiency has a price 
The case of  Farmland Industries is particularly interesting because it represents a mix 
of cooperative values of self-sufficiency and service. Self-reliance may be a  value 
that can be traced to pioneer values of "going it alone" and a wariness or distrust of 
outsiders. A need for self-reliance has also figured prominently in farmers' desire for 
a  source of domestic  fertilizer  supplies  so  they  can undertake  spring planting on 
schedule. During the 1970s energy crisis, farmers were able to accomplish this criti-
cal  task  because  cooperative  resourcefulness  maintained  sufficient  natural  gas 
reserves, a seedstock for fertilizer. This accomplishment became reified as a cultural 
model for a later period of  high natural gas prices. 
During 2001-2002, a period of particularly high natural gas prices, Farmland In-
dustries tried to assure farmers self-sufficiency in fertilizer following the example set 
by cooperatives 30 years earlier. At the recommendation of  members, Farmland went 
into considerable debt to upgrade existing plants within the Farmland system.  Im-
ported  fertilizer  would  have  been  much  cheaper,  possibly  less  available,  and 
sometimes looked odd, because it was colored black instead of white. Farmland was 
the largest farmer cooperative in the US. The fertilizer debt helped pitch it into bank-
ruptcy. 
Aggressive attempts by the former Soviet Republics to move product into the US 
made the 2002 energy crisis differ from the 1970s. The need for cooperatives to re-
spond  to  a  mandate  like  "We  take  care  of our  members",  was  suddenly  an 
anachronism in the context of the wider availability of supply on the world fertilizer 
market. 
. Rethinking conventional notions of service means that some demands made by 
farmers have to matter less than others. Some demands have to go by the wayside. 
The rules of the game have changed. The expectation that farmers will be automati-
cally loyal  to their cooperatives is  no  longer true.  Someone else may be cheaper. 
Someone else may have a better product.  The cultural obligation that cooperatives 
should go out of their way to provide service to their farmer members, is  no longer 
valid. Farmland and Agway experienced problems in part because their definition of 
sjrvice was so producer driven. 
For the local cooperatives that are members of  the regional cooperative, Ag Proc-
essing Inc. (AGP) (Omaha, NE)service is defined as getting a better price for their 
soybeans. AGP, as a  regional  cooperative, is  focused  Ollly  on soybean processing. 
That dedication allows AGP to be a  low cost supplier to industry users of oil and 
meals. If there is a lack of demand for soybean oil or some other setback in the soy 
processing industry, the local  cooperatives who own AGP accept this as  a  conse-
quence  of  their  ownership.  The  lines  of  accountability  are  clear.  This  clear 
demarcation of boundaries seems to be one of the evolving characteristics of coop-
eration. 
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recognition that consolidation has happened within interdependent parts of the food 
chain.  Cooperatives which lack the  critical  mass,  focus,  and capitalization will  be 
locked out of desirable value-added opportunities, such as instant meals. To qualify, 
cooperatives often need to  be low cost producers, which requires high product vol-
umes and dedicated, efficient handling. 
Cooperatives like Farmland and Countrymark who pursued a counter-cyclical di-
versified  portfolio  had  to  spend  considerable  attention  managing  the  divergent 
commodity cycles and any ensuing complications in member relations. Their defini-
tion of service was  necessarily producer-driven. With specialized cooperatives like 
Gold Kist or AGP, what becomes paramount is the relationship with the investment 
partner, whether that is another cooperative or a corporation, as they jointly develop 
their respective  contribution to  a value-added system.  What becomes  important in 
defining service is not what farmer Joe wants but what the customer wants. The defi-
nition of  service is market driven.  / 
Recognizing  that  import  competition  was  chipping  away  at  the  cooperative's 
market share,  citrus  marketing cooperative  Sunkist began  sending the  message to 
members  that  "A  cooperative  does  not  exist  to  altruistically  provide  services  to 
growers but rather to provide product consumers want to  buy."  Many service ori-
ented supply cooperatives have approached diversification from the "add-on" concept 
which ultimately led to a loss of focus.  Sunkist's Navel oranges had tremendous qual-
ity  and consumer name recognition but when they were not on the shelf, consumers 
bought something else. Sunkist needed "add-ons" to keep their name and product in 
front of consumers. Navel oranges were seasonal, growing only during the summer. 
Most cooperatives have  an  implicit  "friend-enemy"  culture:  From  that context, 
foreign suppliers were outsiders. The question any grower might ask would be "How 
was the fruit produced?". So, applying the Sunkist label to imported fruit was a con-
ceptual leap for Sunkist members. 
Language took the  cooperative  from  its  customary rural  boundaries to  a  more 
ambitious, daring vision. "Our competition is not grower vs grower, packinghouse vs 
packinghouse or independent vs  Sunkist. We are competing in a world market place 
for consumption". At this level, the rules have changed. Sunkist said, "If we control 
the fruit that is coming in instead of other people controlling it by bringing it in  at a 
lower price, our growers will benefit by  sell~ng their fruit". This was a different way 
of thinking  about  the  notion  of farmer  control.  Typically,  farmers  fought  import 
competition head on, "my fruit vs your fruit". But Sunkist recognized that free trade 
was a reality and what the cooperative needed was cultural change to adapt to these 
new market conditions. This involved some short-term market displacement of mem-
ber fruit and learning to see former competitors as partners. More importantly, it also 
gave Sunkist the increased volume that has always been cooperatives' goal, whether 
they have been producer or consumer driven.  Growers would sell their fruit along 
with the imported fruit and they,  not Sunkist, would get the profits from the whole 
venture because Sunkist is a cooperative. This was the compelling argument for cul-
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With  Sunkist's  volume,  comes  critical  shelf space  and  consumer  access.  To 
maximize these benefits, Sunkist has verbally repositioned the cooperative, "We are 
not in  the citrus business, we  are  in  the taste business".  Sunkist had  started as  the 
Southern California Fruit  Exchange  in  1893.  However,  bulk oranges  or citrus  are 
restrictive commodity categories that predetermine what the cooperative can do. The 
"taste business" suggests the potential for stimulation, novelty and variety that cate-
gory managers at Walmart and Kroger require to bring in customers. 
Conclusion: Culture at the crossroads 
Cooperatives have an altruistic, service culture that has generated some painful con-
sequences. Cooperatives tried to preserve certain growers or commodity groups, like 
Agway or Farmland Industries, and that bankrupted the entire cooperative. Altruism 
must be  looked at not from maintaining special interest groups but from the stand-
point of maintaining the cooperative as  a whole.  What good does it do  to  preserve 
these groups if  doing so damages the cooperative? Then everyone loses. 
The cultural view that cooperatives are fused with the producer as an extension of 
the farm is being replaced by a new value of  transparency, which allows cooperatives 
to be seen as separate and independent of farmers. This clarity  permit~ a greater de-
gree of financial integrity and latitude in decision-making than allowed by altruistic 
intentions to insulate members from competitive pressures. Transparency frees coop-
eratives to become more market driven. 
Cooperatives want to  be  as  efficient as  their new corporate  partners.  This will 
probably involve making critical decisions about the size of organizations they want 
to  be,  not trying to  be  both big and small simultaneously, a variation on being all 
things to all people. Being a large organization with the extensive bureaucratic net-
work necessary for the personal touch is an outdated cultural model for cooperatives. 
They achieve neither the economic efficiencies of comparably-sized corporations nor 
the personal trust and valuation of  the small town "morn and pop" store. 
Cooperatives face other cultural transitions. The cultural model of  Nourse's com-
petitive y4rdstick was a negative one, skewed to seeing monopolistic exploitation and 
power, not opportunities for cooperative growth and influence. Nourse wanted to see 
that farmers were served well. His cultural legacy may have been a sense of farmer 
entitlement th~t has overburdened the economic capacities of  cooperatives. 
With the industrialization of agriculture, the pendulum is swinging back the other 
way.  Farmers have become regarded in a detached way as  "the most efficient mari~ 
ager of land" within an  industrial management system (Urban,  1996:70). Attention 
has shifted from farmers per se to the drivers of the value-added systems that we are 
finding  in  agriculture  today,  and  that  includes  cooperatives.  These  systems  could 
offer an economically healthier cultural environment for cooperatives to flourish than 
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As part of this transition, cooperative culture is  adopting the mores of a business 
ideology that says "profits are good". Is this a first, critical, step toward separation of 
ownership and control? Does a statement like this - one that Nourse or the Rochdale' 
pioneers would never make - represent an  evolution of cooperative culture or its 
demise? Or, can cooperatives be viewed as fluid, adaptable organizations that can let 
go of some principles and keep others that differentiate them from  the  rest of the 
marketplace? As cooperatives encounter financing and member shortages, a critical 
issue is defining what makes a cooperative a cooperative. 
The word "caring" was often used by managers in talking about members, so that 
it does seem as if "Cooperatives are like a family". As such, despite academic sug-
gestions that cooperatives and corporations will become essentially interchangeable 
as hybrid organizations, cooperatives may have succeeded in building an irreversible 
culture that simply needs to become somewhat more efficient, e.g., moPe discriminat-
ing in rendering service. 
One conclusion from this research is that service is not incompatible with "mak-
ing money" if service is redesigned to fit market constraints. The "add on" model of 
service was  a  contingency driven model of cooperation,  consistent with a  cultural 
emphasis on "farmer as  victim  or farmer  being shortchanged in  the  marketplace". 
The second conclusion is that preserving cooperative uniqueness or specificity can be 
a challenge as cooperatives try to adapt to the changing conditions of an increasingly 
globalized world. The "add on" model and the caring, familial model put one-sided 
financial pressure on cooperatives, without equal pressure on members to be loyal or 
to question whether they were placing too many demands on cooperatives. The fam-
ily culture has to be replaced by  a culture of partnership (whether inside or outside 
the cooperative system) because the cooperative system cannot afford the continued 
cost of  dependency. 
Cooperative culture has inextricably linked people, place, and assets, neither be-
ing definable without the other.  For example,  dairy farmers  used to  visit artificial 
insemination cooperatives, taking pride in  their facility and buying from  it because 
they had inspected the bulls. Export health restrictions for semen now preclude this. 
The culture of the personal touch and the tangible asset may he changing as, seeking 
growth, cooperatives extend runners to other countries. Sunkist has begun importing 
fruit from other countries. No longer is a fixed domestic location or facility necessar-
ily going to be the hallmark of a cooperative. More likely it will be the free floating 
symbol of the cooperative brand, found  anywhere in the world.  As the number of 
American farmers declines, cooperative strength may grow through adding foreign 
producers as members, especially as consumer tastes for the exotic, unusual, or out of 
season increase. This will increase the cultural challenges facing American coopera-
tives. 36  J.A.  Hogeland 
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